Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a new covering radius of RM ( ) from cryptography viewpoint. It is defined as the maximum distance between -resilient functions and the th order Reed-Muller code RM ( ). We next derive its lower and upper bounds. We further present a table of numerical data of our bounds.
, where each is a binary variable. Then any Boolean function is uniquely written as the algebraic normal form such that
The degree of , denoted by , is defined as the degree of the highest degree term in the algebraic normal form. Now let be a Boolean function such that . Let be a noisy version of in some sense. Then in coding theory
• is a codeword of the th order Reed-Muller code RM ; • is a received word when is sent; and • the noise should be small. The covering radius of RM is defined as RM where the maximum is taken over any . In cryptography, on the other hand, we have the following.
• is used as a main component of stream ciphers. In nonlinear combination generators, it must be -resilient [2] , [1] to resist the fast correlation attack [13] . [8] .
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T. • is an approximation of which attackers make use of.
• The noise should be large to resist attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new covering radius of RM from the viewpoint of cryptography. It is defined as the maximum distance between -resilient functions and the th order Reed-Muller code RM . That is,
RM
where the maximum is taken over -resilient functions . It is clear that
We next derive some lower bounds and upper bounds on
. We finally present a table of numerical data of our bounds. One of our upper bounds is a generalization of the previous result for [17] , [20] , [22] . Our new concept is also meaningful to cryptography in the context of the new class of algebraic attacks on stream ciphers proposed by Courtois 
B. Nonlinearity
Ding et al. [5] showed that a linear attack can break the nonlinear combination generator if is approximated by an affine function.
is called an affine function if
Hence, of Fig. 1 must have a large distance from the set of affine functions.
The nonlinearity of , denoted by , is defined as a distance between and the set of affine functions . That is, Since RM , we see that RM (In [5] , the authors called the linear attack the BAA attack, where BAA stands for best affine approximation.)
C. Resiliency
We say that is balanced if Equivalently used in nonlinear combination generators must be balanced because the keystream must be random. Further, the output should not be correlated with any small subset of . Otherwise, the fast correlation attack succeeds [13] . For example, if is correlated with some , then the initial value of the th LFSR can be found by the fast correlation attack [13] .
We have the following definitions.
Definition 2.1 ([19]):
We say that is correlation immune of order if is not correlated with any -subset of . That is, is correlation immune of order if for any positions and any bits .
Definition 2.2 ([2], [1]):
We say that is -resilient if is balanced and is correlation immune of order . That is, is -resilient if for any positions and any bits .
Consequently, must be -resilient for large . Siegenthaler showed the following inequality.
Proposition 2.1 ([19]):
If is -resilient for , then where .
D. Previous Work
From the above discussion, we see that must be -resilient for large and should be as large as possible in nonlinear combination generators. Sarkar and Maitra showed the following divisibility result [17] . (A similar result was shown in [22] ).
Proposition 2.2:
Let be a -resilient function and be an affine function. Then
In [17] , [20] , [22] , the authors derived an upper bound on of -resilient functions as follows. (Remark) Carlet and Sarkar [3] derived general weight divisibility on the Walsh transform of Boolean functions.
III. LOW-DEGREE APPROXIMATION ATTACK
In this section, we introduce a low-degree approximation attack on stream ciphers by generalizing the linear attack of [5] . Nonlinear combination generators are broken by this attack if of Fig. 1 is approximated by a low-degree Boolean function.
A. Underlying Idea
Suppose that is approximated by . That is,
If the linear complexity of is not large enough, then the fast correlation attack [13] can find the initial value of from a short segment of . The linear complexity of generated by the nonlinear combination generator is given by the following proposition [14, p. 205] . In a nonlinear combination generator of Fig. 1 
B. Proposed Attack
We now show our attack. In Fig. 1 The proposed attack is to find the initial value of from a short segment of by using the fast correlation attack attack [13] .
It succeeds if is not large enough. If is found, then we can obtain the whole sequence of . This implies that a large part of is leaked since is an approximation of . In other words, is a noisy version of and the noise is small.
Therefore, a large part of the plaintext sequence is leaked.
IV. NEW COVERING RADIUS FOR -RESILIENT FUNCTIONS
In this section, we introduce a new covering radius of Reed-Muller codes from a view point of cryptography.
A. Covering Radius of Reed-Muller Code
The th-order Reed-Muller code RM is identical to the set of Boolean functions such that . The covering radius of RM is defined as the maximum distance between and RM . That is, RM where the maximum is taken over . 
B. New Covering Radius for -Resilient Functions
We say that is an -resilient function if and is -resilient. Now of Fig. 1 should not be approximated even by low-degree Boolean functions to resist the low-degree approximation attack shown in Section III. Further, should be -resilient to be secure against the fast correlation attacks.
From In [17] , [20] , [22] , the authors derived an upper bound on in our terminology.
V. LOWER BOUNDS ON
In this section, we derive lower bounds on . Then it is easy to see that is a -resilient function. The rest of the proof is similar to the above.
A. Lower Bound for

Corollary 5.1:
. 
C. Lower Bound for Any (II)
